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MEMO TO THE PARTNER 
 
ARTICLES OF AMENDMENT FOR TN COMPANY, INC. 
 
JORDANA K. NELSON* 
 
TO: Law Firm Partner 
FROM: Jordana K. Nelson 
RE: Articles of Amendment for TN Company, Inc. 
I.  GENERAL 
I attach for your review a draft of the mandatory conversion provision to be 
included in TN Company, Inc.’s (the “Company”) articles of amendment 
establishing a new class of preferred stock.  I also attach a glossary of terms used in 
the draft provision.  This glossary should be incorporated into the definition section 
of the final articles of amendment.  Terms used and not defined in this 
memorandum have the meanings ascribed to them in the glossary.  This 
memorandum explains the context of the transaction, my drafting choices, and the 
relationship between the two.  Various associates are currently drafting the other 
provisions of the articles of amendment.  I reference those other provisions both in 
this memorandum and in the mandatory conversion provision. 
II.  TRANSACTIONAL CONTEXT 
The Company is a privately held Tennessee corporation.  Five people 
currently hold shares in the Company; none holds more than fifty percent of the 
Company’s outstanding common stock.  Currently, the Company owns three 
restaurants in Memphis, Tennessee.  Due to the success of these restaurants, the 
Company is considering opportunities to expand its business within the State of 
Tennessee.   However, expansion of the business requires additional capital. 
Each of the five current shareholders initially contributed between $70,000 
and $100,000 to the Company; those initial contributions were expended primarily 
on the start-up costs of the Company.  The Company has approximately $500,000 of 
outstanding debt, consisting primarily of ground leases and the cost of acquiring 
equipment for the restaurants.   
                                                 
* Jordana K. Nelson is an associate in the Commercial Transactions and Real Estate practice area of 
Bass, Berry & Sims PLC in Knoxville, Tennessee.  Ms. Nelson would like to thank Professor Joan 
MacLeod Heminway for her thoughtful review of drafts of this work.  She would also like to thank 
her husband, Eric K. Nelson, for his continued support of her legal career. 
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The Company currently has one class of equity securities outstanding.  
However, authorized capitalization includes 50,000 shares of common stock, with a 
par value of $0.01 per share and 100,000 shares of preferred stock, par value $0.01 
per share, which may be issued in series designated by the Board of Directors of the 
Company (the “Board”) in resolutions. 
The Board has considered issuing additional debt in order to raise capital for 
expansion of the Company’s business.  However, issuing additional debt would 
potentially over-leverage the Company’s assets.  Rather than issuing additional debt, 
the Board currently plans to create a new class of preferred stock, the Series A 
Cumulative Convertible Preferred Stock, par value $0.01 per share (the “Series A”), 
which would be created under blank check authority in the Company’s charter.  The 
Series A will provide a vehicle for the Company to raise capital to finance the 
expansion of its business and will spread the risk of expansion to more investors.   
Preferred stock is “almost the universal security of choice for venture capital 
firms investing in U.S. start-up companies.”1  Because preferred stock enjoys a 
priority over common stock upon liquidation, preferred stock may be more attractive 
to investors than common stock.  The potential for preferred dividends adds to the 
attraction of issuing preferred stock as a means to raise capital.  However, the Board 
has bigger plans for the Company.  In order to expand the business beyond 
Tennessee, the Board anticipates either a public offering of the Company’s stock or 
entering into some form of business combination with another corporation.  
Accordingly, one of the Board’s largest concerns is the risk of litigation with its 
existing security holders if either of these transactions takes place. 
Because the Board anticipates either a public offering of the Company’s 
stock or a business combination at some point in the future, the Board must retain 
the ability to alter the Company’s capitalization to make it attractive to an 
underwriter or to an acquisition partner.  Therefore, tension exists between the 
Company’s immediate need to create a class of preferred stock attractive to investors 
and the future need to create a capital structure attractive to an underwriter or 
acquisition partner. 
The most recent similar preferred stock financing transaction that this firm 
contemplated involved a Delaware corporation that is also in the restaurant business.  
That corporation, DE Company, Inc., also anticipated either a public offering of 
                                                 
1 Kenneth J. Lebrun, Making a Private Equity/Venture Capital Investment in Japan: Implementing Techniques 
Commonly Used in U.S. Transactions, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L. ECON. L. 213, 217 (2002). 
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common stock or a business combination at some point after its series of preferred 
stock was issued.  At your request, I have drafted the Company’s certificate of 
amendment based upon the certificate of designation we drafted for the DE 
Company, Inc., transaction.   
III.  ISSUES 
In drafting the conversion option for the Series A, I had to resolve a number 
of drafting issues.  The three most important issues with which I grappled are set 
forth and described in brief below. 
A.  How can the Company balance its need for flexibility as to future 
transactions with the Series A shareholders’ need for certainty in their 
investments? 
I considered three types of conversion provisions: mandatory (upon the 
occurrence of an event or other condition);2 at the option of the holder;3 and at the 
option of the board.4  The mandatory conversion provision favors neither the board 
nor the holders and offers no flexibility to either party.  A provision permitting 
conversion at the option of the holder effectively limits the power of the board.  
Where, as here, future plans for the capitalization of an issuer require its board to 
retain some flexibility, a paragraph providing for mandatory conversion at the option 
of the board is the most appropriate provision.   
B.  What event(s) or transaction(s) should trigger the Board’s 
conversion option? 
Based on the Company’s long-term business expansion goals and its likely 
sources of future capital, a public offering of the Company’s common stock and a 
                                                 
2 A mandatory conversion provision provides that upon a stated event or occurrence, the preferred 
stock automatically will be converted into common stock.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(e) (2005); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-16-101(c)(2)(A) (2005). 
3 A provision permitting conversion at the option of the holder provides that upon a stated event or 
occurrence, the holders have the option of converting their preferred stock into common stock, 
subject to the other terms and provisions of the preferred stock.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(e) 
(2005); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-16-101(c)(2)(A) (2005). 
4 A provision permitting conversion at the option of the board provides that upon a stated event or 
occurrence, the board will have the option of requiring preferred stockholders to convert their shares 
of preferred stock into common stock.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(e) (2005); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 48-16-101(c)(2)(A) (2005). 
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change of control of the Company each should trigger the Board’s option to require 
conversion of the Series A. 
C.  How should “change of control” be defined for purposes of the 
conversion trigger? 
Various events and transactions constitute changes in control of a 
corporation.  Although the language in our firm’s precedent document, a certificate 
of designation for a series of preferred stock issued by a Delaware corporation, is a 
competent place to start, the definition in that precedent Delaware law document 
must be checked for compliance with Tennessee law.  Moreover, the definitions and 
types of transactions included in the trigger must be reviewed for inclusiveness and 
approved by the Company. 
IV.  ANALYSIS OF SPECIFIC DRAFTING CHOICES 
A.  Choice of Provision 
Because the Company desires to balance its competing needs (attracting 
investors versus retaining as much flexibility as possible), a provision giving the 
Board the power to require conversion upon the occurrence of specified events is an 
appropriate choice.   
Under section 48-16-101(c) of the Tennessee Code, a corporation’s charter 
may authorize classes of shares (in addition to the required class of common stock) 
that “[h]ave special, conditional, or limited voting rights[;]…[a]re redeemable or 
convertible[;]” entitle their holders to preferences or dividends; or “[h]ave a par 
value[.]”5  Section 48-16-101(c)(2)(A), which specifically addresses convertible shares, 
provides that a corporation’s charter may designate that certain classes of shares are 
convertible “[a]t the option of the corporation, the shareholder, or another person or 
upon the occurrence of a designated event.” 6   
In this case, a mandatory conversion provision is not advantageous to either 
the board or the holders of preferred stock.7  Should conversion be disadvantageous 
                                                 
5 TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-16-101(c) (2005). 
6 § 48-16-101(c)(2)(A). 
7 However, where a mandatory conversion provision is conditioned only upon an initial public 
offering, investors and management often agree on mandatory conversion because the offering 
provides an exit strategy for investors and a single class of stock that is more attractive to 
underwriters.  Lebrun, supra note 1, at 220. 
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for the issuer of the preferred stock or the investors, it may be difficult or impossible 
to prevent the mandatory conversion from occurring.  
A provision allowing for conversion at the option of the holder is most 
attractive to investors, because the holder exerts total control over whether the 
preferred stock is converted to common stock.  While this type of provision severely 
limits the board’s control and flexibility, it is very attractive to investors. 
A preferred stock term providing for conversion at the option of the board 
with no contingency event is clearly most attractive to a board.  However, if the 
board exerts total control over conversion of a series of preferred stock, the 
preferences of the preferred stock over the common stock are constantly at risk.  
The possibility of arbitrary forced conversion is unattractive to investors. 
The type of provision that I chose to draft provides the holders of the Series 
A some protection by conditioning the Board’s option to require conversion on the 
Board’s approval of a Qualified Public Offering or a Change of Control.  The Board 
retains some degree of flexibility by having the option to require conversion in these 
limited, anticipated circumstances.  This type of provision favors the Board, but 
because of the long-term plans for the Company (which are being disclosed to 
investors in the Series A in connection with the solicitation by the Company of their 
investment in the Company), this level of control by the Board is warranted. 
B.  The Triggering Transactions 
Any number of events could be used to trigger the Board’s option to require 
conversion.  However, a Qualified Public Offering and a Change of Control are the 
most appropriate triggering events for the Company.  Additionally, these transactions 
are common triggers for optional conversion rights in preferred stock of this kind. 
Most preferred stock terms that I reviewed dealt with mandatory conversion 
in the event of an initial public offering or a change of control, but not both.  In 
many industries, a corporation anticipates either an initial public offering or a change 
of control.  However, the “chain” restaurant industry appears to function differently.  
Many “concept” restaurants begin in the same manner as the Company’s restaurants; 
the founders develop the concept and open a few restaurants in one city or state.  If 
the concept appears successful, the founders may try either to expand the business 
themselves or sell the existing locations and concept to an established group to be 
developed.  For example, Panera Bread Company began when Au Bon Pain 
Company, Inc., an already established chain of bakery-cafes on the east coast, 
“purchased…the Saint Louis Bread Company, a chain of [twenty] bakery-cafes 
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located in” St. Louis, Missouri.8  The concept of St. Louis Bread Company was 
refined and renamed Panera Bread Company.9   
The Panera Bread Company, through franchising and company-owned 
stores, now boasts 825 bakery-cafes in 35 states.10  In contrast, P.F. Chang’s China 
Bistro, Inc., which was founded in 1993, expanded its restaurant concept on its own.  
Ultimately, P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., was able to offer its common stock to 
the investing public as a Nasdaq National Market System security in 1998.11  As of 
early 2006, P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., owned and operated 115 bistros in 32 
states.12   
The Board is attempting to raise capital to expand the Company’s restaurant 
concept on a local level.  It hopes that the Company’s success at the local level will 
enable the Company to further expand its restaurant concept.  However, the Board 
is unsure of the direction the Company will take in financing any future expansion.  
Therefore, the Board wants to preserve the option either to (a) undertake a public 
offering of the Company’s common stock or (b) approve or accede to a change of 
control of the Company. 
In the event that the Company elects to initiate a public offering of its 
common stock, it will most likely offer the stock on a “firm commitment” basis.  In 
a firm commitment offering, an underwriter purchases the offering corporation’s 
stock and then distributes that stock to the investing public.13  Companies offering 
their stock to the investing public for the first time often have the most difficulty 
procuring an underwriter.14  Most underwriters prefer to work with an issuer 
                                                 
8 Panera Bread, Company Overview, at http://www.panerabread.com/about_co_history.aspx (last visited 
Feb. 27, 2006). 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 NASDAQ National Market Securities, at 
http://www.nasdaq.com/asp/symbols.asp?exchange=NNM&start=P&Type=O (last visited Feb. 27, 
2006). 
12 P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Corporate Overview, at http://www.corporate-
ir.net/ireye/ir_site.zhtml?ticker=pfcb&script=2100 (last visited Feb. 27, 2006). 
13 Steven J. Gray, The Initial Underwritten Public Offering, in 1 SECURITIES LAW TECHNIQUES 15-6 (A.A. 
Sommer, Jr. ed., 2005). 
14 Id. at 15-8. 
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capitalized with only one class of common shares so that the investors enjoy 
maximum participation in the company’s future growth.15  Accordingly, the option to 
require conversion in the event of a public offering of the Company’s stock may be 
essential to the Company’s later success in procuring an underwriter should that be 
desirable. 
If the Company sells its restaurant concept, thereby causing a change of 
control, the current shareholders want to ensure that the consideration for the sale is 
divided fairly among the then-current shareholders.  If each shareholder holds 
common stock of the same class at the time of the change of control, the 
consideration can be divided simply and equally on a per share basis.  Because all  the 
shareholders will be treated equally, the risk of litigation is likely reduced.   
In addition to eliminating the costs associated with potential litigation, should 
the Board determine that a business combination is most advantageous, the reduced 
risk of litigation should render the Company more attractive to potential acquisition 
partners.   
Conversely, should circumstances dictate that existence of the preferred class 
of shares is preferable, the Board has retained its right to decline to require 
conversion of the preferred shares. 
C.  Definition of “Change of Control” 
Perhaps the most important part of the Series A conversion provision are the 
definitions of triggering transactions, and in particular, the definition of a Change of 
Control.  The certificate of designation of DE Company, Inc., defines a Change of 
Control as “a merger or consolidation of the Corporation or a sale, transfer, or other 
disposition of all or substantially all the Corporation's property, assets, or business to 
another corporation….” 
While this definition may be suitable for a Delaware corporation, the 
language is not suitable for a Tennessee corporation. 
1. Which transactions to include in the definition of Change of 
Control. 
Under section 251(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law, a merger 
occurs when two or more corporations merge into a single corporation, with the 
                                                 
15 Id. at 15-20 to 15-21.    
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surviving corporation being any one of the merging corporations.16  Two or more 
corporations may also consolidate to form a new corporation.17  A merger or 
consolidation must be approved by a majority of the stockholders “entitled to vote 
thereon[.]”18  With some exceptions,19 all stockholders entitled to vote on the merger 
or consolidation are also entitled to appraisal rights if they do not vote in favor of 
the transaction and meet the procedural requirements of the appraisal rights statute.20  
Under section 271(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law, a majority of 
stockholders must approve the sale, lease, or exchange of “all or substantially all” of 
a corporation’s property or assets.21  However, in an asset sale transaction, the 
stockholders are not entitled to appraisal rights under Delaware law.22 
Under section 48-21-102 of the Tennessee Code, two corporations may 
merge into one corporation.23  Unlike Delaware, Tennessee law does not recognize a 
consolidation as a separate form of transaction.24  Tennessee law does, however, 
recognize a share exchange under Tennessee Code section 48-21-103, a transaction 
                                                 
16 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(a) (2005). 
17 Id. 
18 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (2005).  Under section 212(a) of the Delaware General 
Corporation Law, “each stockholder shall be entitled to [one] vote for each share of capital stock held 
by such stockholder.”  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212(a) (2005).  However, this default rule can be 
varied in the corporation’s charter.  Id. 
19 No appraisal rights are available to the stockholders of corporations that, as of the record date fixed 
to determine stockholders entitled to notice of and to vote on the merger or consolidation, are “(i) 
listed on a national securities exchange or designated as a national market system security on an 
interdealer quotation system by the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. or (ii) held by 
more than 2,000 holders.”  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b)(1) (2005).  Additionally, stockholders in a 
corporation that survives the merger are not entitled to appraisal rights unless the stockholders were 
required to approve the merger.  Id. 
20 Id. § 262(a)-(b). 
21 Id. § 271(a). 
22 See id. 
23 TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-21-102 (2005). 
24 However, the Tennessee Code does contemplate and allow for the possibility that a merger may 
result in the creation of a new entity.  See TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-21-108(a)(1) (2005). 
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that is not provided for, by statute or otherwise, under Delaware law.25  As a default 
rule under Tennessee law, both a merger and a share exchange must be approved by 
a majority of the shareholders entitled to vote.26  Under section 48-22-102(a) of the 
Tennessee Code, “[a] corporation may sell, lease, exchange, or otherwise dispose of 
all, or substantially all, of its property (with or without the good will) otherwise than 
in the usual and regular course of business[.]”27  Under Tennessee Code section 48-
22-102(e), a sale of assets qualifying under section 48-22-102(a) must be approved by 
a majority of the shareholders entitled to vote thereon.28  A Tennessee corporation’s 
shareholders have the right to dissent from a merger, share exchange, or disposition 
of all or substantially all of the corporation’s assets otherwise than in the usual and 
regular course of business and seek an appraisal of their shares only if the 
shareholders are entitled to vote on such transaction.29  As is true for Delaware 
stockholders, Tennessee shareholders may exercise their appraisal rights only if they 
do not vote for the subject transaction and if they follow the required statutory 
procedures.30  
Based on the foregoing differences in Delaware and Tennessee law, at a 
minimum, the exemplar DE Company, Inc., provision must be revised to delete the 
reference to a consolidation and add a reference to the possibility of a share 
exchange transaction, so that the definition addresses a possible merger, share 
                                                 
25 Id. § 48-21-103. 
26 Id. § 48-21-104(c)(2), (f).  For purposes of title 48, chapter 21 of the Tennessee Code, which 
regulates mergers and share exchanges, “‘[v]oting shares’ means shares that entitle their holders to 
vote unconditionally in the election of directors.”  Id. § 48-21-101(4).  Generally, under Tennessee law, 
“each outstanding share, regardless of class, is entitled to one…vote on each matter voted on at a 
shareholders' meeting.”  Id. § 48-17-202(a).  “[D]irectors are [generally] elected by a plurality of the 
votes cast by the shares entitled to vote in the election.”  Id. § 48-17-209(a).  However,  voting rights 
may be modified in the corporation’s charter.  Id.   
Here, the five holders of the Company’s common stock have requested that the preferred 
shareholders’ voting rights be as limited as possible.  Therefore, under the articles of amendment, the 
Series A holders will have no voting rights.   
27 TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-22-102(a) (2005). 
28 § 48-22-102(e). 
29 TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-23-102(a)(1)-(3) (2005).  Here, the Series A holders are not entitled to vote 
on any of the transactions and, therefore, have no dissenters’ rights. 
30 § 48-23-202. 
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exchange, or sale of all or substantially all of the Company’s assets other than in the 
usual and regular course of business.   
2. Conversion price applied to each Change of Control 
transaction. 
An additional consideration is whether to treat all of the transactions in the 
same way with regard to conversion price.  In a merger or share exchange, each 
target corporation shareholder typically receives cash or securities representing an 
interest in a different corporation.  However, following an asset sale, each selling 
corporation shareholder continues to hold shares in the same corporation; that 
corporation simply has different assets after the transaction.  If the selling 
corporation does not distribute the proceeds of the asset sale, the shareholders are 
compensated through any increase in the value of their shares in the selling 
corporation. 
Because the results of each transaction differ, shareholders may receive 
different benefits based on the type of business combination, or change of control, 
in which the corporation is a party.  The Company could then structure a future 
change of control in a manner that, in the view of the preferred shareholders, may be 
less desirable on a financial basis. 
The Company’s ability to distinguish between transactions is supported by 
case law.  Because Tennessee case law is somewhat undeveloped in the corporate law 
area, Tennessee courts look to Delaware law, as well as to the corporate law 
decisions of other states.31  In Hariton v. Arco Electronics, Inc.,32 the sale of a 
corporation’s assets under section 271 of the Delaware General Corporation Law, 
followed by a dissolution under section 275 of the Delaware General Corporation 
Law (and resulting distribution of assets to stockholders) accomplished the same 
results as a merger would have produced.  The plaintiff stockholder argued that the 
corporation had undergone a de facto merger and that the stockholders should be 
treated as they would be in a merger (i.e., that they should be given appraisal rights).33  
                                                 
31 See Bayberry Assocs. v. Jones, 1988 Tenn. App. LEXIS 589, at *14 n.8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 
1988), vacated on other grounds, 783 S.W.2d 553 (Tenn. 1990). 
32 182 A.2d 22 (Del. Ch. 1962), aff'd, 188 A.2d 123 (Del. 1963). 
33 Id. at 24. 
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However, the Hariton court held that when a corporation acts on the authority of a 
statute, the validity of the action is dependent only upon that statute.34   
Despite the Hariton holding, which is favorable to corporations, one of our 
client’s goals is to reduce the risk of litigation.  Although the holding and reasoning 
of the court in Hariton is favorable to the Company, not every jurisdiction has 
followed this holding and reasoning.35  However, if all transactions are treated equally 
under the conversion provision, the incentive to litigate the characterization of the 
transaction is reduced.36    
3. Whether to define each or any Change of Control 
transaction. 
While reviewing different precedent documents before drafting this 
provision, I noticed that none of the transactions included in the definition of a 
Change of Control were themselves defined.  At first blush, the omission of such 
definitions appears to be careless drafting.  After all, countless cases exist where the 
board of directors argues that a transaction does not constitute a merger within the 
meaning of the certificate of designation and the shareholders insist that the 
transaction is, indeed, a merger (or vice versa).37   
However, after careful consideration, I also have omitted definitions for the 
individual transactions included in the Change of Control definition.  If the different 
                                                 
34 Id. at 27.  The doctrine described in Hariton is commonly referred to as the doctrine of independent 
legal significance or equal dignity.  See, e.g., Langfelder v. Universal Laboratories, Inc., 68 F. Supp. 209, 
211 (D. Del. 1946); Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Avatex Corp., 715 A.2d 843, 845 (Del. 1998); Thorpe v. 
CERBCO, 676 A.2d 436, 444 (Del. 1946).  
35 See, e.g., Applestein v. United Bd. & Carton Corp., 159 A.2d 146, 156 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1960) 
(holding that “it is proper to disregard the [f]orm of a sale or purchase of assets transaction[ ] when its 
characteristics are virtually identical to those of a statutory merger or consolidation for the purpose of 
insuring [sic] dissenting stockholders their appraisal rights”). 
36 It should be noted that the holders of the Series A will have only limited dissenters’ rights.  Under 
Tennessee law, a shareholder’s right to dissent from a corporate action is generally limited to 
situations where the shareholder is entitled to vote on the corporate action.  See TENN. CODE ANN. § 
48-23-102 (2005).  Since the Series A will not have voting rights on any of the transactions included in 
the change of control definition, see supra notes 26 and 29, this basis for litigation has been foreclosed. 
37 See, e.g., Hariton, 182 A.2d at 24 (plaintiff stockholder arguing that the corporation underwent a de 
facto merger); Rauch v. RCA Corporation, 861 F.2d 29, 30 (plaintiff stockholder arguing “that the 
merger constituted a ‘liquidation or dissolution or winding up of RCA and a redemption of the 
[Preferred Stock]’”). 
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transactions are defined in the articles of amendment, the Company may be limited 
in how it can structure each type of transaction.  This restriction of the Company’s 
structuring capability may, in turn, limit its bargaining power when negotiating with 
third parties that may be interested in engaging in a business combination transaction 
with the Company.  I determined that the risk of litigation on the transactional 
definitions is outweighed by the need for flexibility on the part of the Board in 
negotiating future transactions.  However, as discussed below, I have given more 
careful consideration to the decision of defining what constitutes a sale of 
“substantially all” the assets of the Company, since this type of transaction presents 
unique issues. 
Instead of including definitions, I have included references to the appropriate 
statutes for each transaction.  These references, although unconventional in 
corporate finance drafting, lend some additional precision to the document.  So long 
as the Company has authority to authorize each transaction under the appropriate 
statute, there should be little argument regarding the characterization of the 
transaction. 
4. Defining “substantially all” for purposes of the sale of assets 
Change of Control trigger. 
The asset sale portion of the Change of Control definition presents a unique 
issue.  Although mergers and share exchange transactions may not always be obvious 
to a court without a definition or statutory reference, they are significantly easier to 
identify than sales of substantially all the assets.  Section 48-22-102(a) of the 
Tennessee Code requires shareholder approval only when a corporation disposes of 
“all, or substantially all,” of its assets other “than in the usual and regular course” of 
its business.38  However, the statute provides no guidance for determining when 
“substantially all” of a corporation’s assets have been disposed of.   
Notably, the Model Business Corporation Act (the “MBCA”), on which the 
Tennessee Business Corporation Act is modeled, does not include the “substantially 
all” language.  Instead, section 12.02(a) of the current version of the MBCA requires 
shareholder approval for a disposition of assets “if the disposition would leave the 
corporation without a significant continuing business activity.”39  Section 12.02(a) 
also provides that  
                                                 
38 TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-22-102(a) (2005). 
39 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 12.02(a) (2004). 
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[i]f a corporation retains a business activity 
that represented at least 25 percent of total assets at 
the end of the most recently completed fiscal year, 
and 25 percent of either income from continuing 
operations before taxes or revenues from continuing 
operations for that fiscal year, in each case of the 
corporation and its subsidiaries on a consolidated 
basis, the corporation will conclusively be deemed to 
have retained a significant continuing business 
activity.40 
While this model statute is instructive, the Tennessee legislature has not yet 
chosen to adopt it.  Therefore, it is not the definition of “substantially all” in 
Tennessee. 
Tennessee courts have not addressed this issue in a reported opinion.  
Therefore, we must look again to Delaware law and the law of other jurisdictions.41  
Delaware courts have considered this issue on many occasions.  In Gimbel v. Signal 
Companies, Inc.,42 the court found that all, or substantially all, of a corporation’s assets 
are sold “[i]f the sale is of assets quantitatively vital to the operation of the 
corporation and…substantially affects the existence and purpose of the 
corporation[.]”.43  In applying Gimbel, Delaware courts appear to stress the qualitative 
prong of the test by analyzing the continuing effect of the sale on the ongoing 
corporate enterprise.44   
Apparently, there is no single, agreed-upon definition of “substantially all.”  
Moreover, if “substantially all” is defined in the document, the same limitations are 
imposed on the Board as would be imposed by defining “merger.”  Even here, the 
risk of litigation on the meaning of “substantially all” is outweighed by the Board’s 
                                                 
40 Id.  It should be noted that the previous version of the MBCA did not include such a specific 
definition; that earlier version of the MBCA contained language similar to the Tennessee Business 
Corporation Act. 
41 See supra text accompanying note 31. 
42 316 A.2d 599 (Del. Ch. 1974). 
43 Id. at 606 (emphasis added), quoted in DAVID A. DREXLER ET AL., 2 DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW 
AND PRACTICE § 37.03 (Janet C. Foster et al. eds., 2005). 
44 DREXLER ET AL., supra note 43, at §  37.03. 
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need for flexibility.  This conclusion is supported by the fact that I found no 
precedent documents that defined “substantially all.” 
D.  Minor Drafting Choices 
To make the mandatory conversion provision easier to read, I reformatted 
the provision into subsections.  I changed all references to “stockholders” to 
“shareholders” (In Delaware, the preferred statutory term is “stockholders,” while in 
Tennessee the preferred statutory term is “shareholders”).45  I used the same 
definition of a Qualified Initial Public Offering as was used in the DE Company, 
Inc., precedent document.  The $10,000,000 requirement is most likely the smallest 
offering of stock that an underwriter would accept.46 
I also have bracketed the language following each statutory reference.  I 
realize that “hedging” language47 must be included in the document, but any 
suggestions for consolidating this language in one part of the provision would be 
appreciated. 
Section 6(b) of the mandatory conversion provision refers to the general 
conversion procedures set forth in Section 7 of the articles of amendment.  As you 
are aware, other associates in the firm currently are drafting that provision. 
I appreciate the opportunity to work on this offering.  Please let me know if 
you have any questions on this memorandum or the attached draft provision. 
   
                                                 
45 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 101-398 (2005); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-11-201(25) (2005). 
46  Richard A. Mann, et al., Starting From Scratch: A Lawyer's Guide To Representing A Start-Up Company, 56 
ARK. L. REV. 773, 842 n.500 (2004) (classifying a $10,000,000 offering as a small offering); Jeffrey A. 
Brill, Note, “Testing the Waters” - The SEC's Feet Go From Wet to Cold, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 464, 545 
(1998) (“IPOs above Regulation A’s ceiling of $ 5 million, but below $ 10 million are often too small 
to attract underwriters, particularly larger ones with established reputations.”). 
47 “Hedging” language is included after a statutory reference and refers to any amendments to the 
statute and successor statutes so that the statutory reference does not become obsolete.  See Caroline 
N. Brown, U.C.C. Revised Article 9: The Transition Rules, 79 N.C. L. Rev. 993, 1000-03 (2001) (discussing 
the disadvantages of such language in connection with security agreements referencing Article 9 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code). 
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GLOSSARY OF DEFINED TERMS 
“Board of Directors” means the board of directors of the Company. 
“Business Day” means any day that is not a Saturday or Sunday or a day on which 
banks are required or permitted to be closed in the State of Tennessee. 
“Change of Control” is defined in Section 6(a)(ii). 
“Common Stock” means the common stock, par value $0.01 per share, of the 
Company. 
“Company” means TN Company, Inc., a Tennessee corporation. 
“Holder” means a registered holder of Series A shares. 
“Initial Issue Date” means the date on which shares of Series A are first issued by 
the Company. 
“Notice of Conversion” means a conversion notice in the form attached as Exhibit 
A. 
“Qualified Initial Public Offering” is defined in Section 6(a)(i). 
“Series A” means the Series A Convertible Preferred Stock, par value $0.01 per 
share, of the Company. 
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DRAFT OF MANDATORY CONVERSION PROVISION  
6.  Conversion at the Company’s Election.   
(a)  For purposes of this Section 6: 
 (i) “Qualified Initial Public Offering” means an underwritten 
public offering of shares of the Common Stock under an effective registration 
statement under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, (x) the aggregate gross 
proceeds of which equal or exceed $10,000,000 and (y) the per share offering price 
of which equals or exceeds $10.00; provided, however, that the per share offering 
price referred to in clause (y) shall be adjusted to reflect the effect of any stock split 
or any subdivision, reclassification, combination, or like event affecting the 
outstanding shares of Common Stock and occurring after the Initial Issue Date; and 
 (ii) “Change of Control” means: (x) the sale, lease, exchange, or 
other disposition of all, or substantially all, of the Company’s property (with or 
without the associated good will) otherwise than in the usual and regular course of 
business as the same is described in Tennessee Code Annotated § 48-22-102 [or any 
successor statute, as the same may be in effect from time to time]; (y) a merger of the 
Company under Tennessee Code Annotated § 48-21-102 [or any successor statute, as 
the same may be in effect from time to time]; or (z) a share exchange under 
Tennessee Code Annotated § 48-21-103 [or any successor statute, as the same may 
be in effect from time to time]. 
(b)  The Company may call for the conversion of all or any portion of the 
Series A upon the occurrence of either of the following: 
(i) approval by the Board of a Qualified Initial Public Offering; 
or   
 (ii) approval by the Board and by shareholders of the Company 
entitled to vote of a transaction that results in a Change of Control.   
(c)  A call for conversion under Section 6(b)(i) shall become effective 
immediately prior to effectiveness of the registration statement contemplated by 
Section 6(a)(i) in the manner set forth in Section 7.48 
                                                 
48 Section 7 details the general conversion procedures for the Series A.  As I indicated in my 
memorandum to the Partner, that Section is being drafted by another associate. 
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(d)  A call for conversion under Section 6(b)(ii) shall become effective on the 
date immediately prior to the time at which the Change of Control becomes effective 
in the manner set forth in Section 7. 
 
      
 
 
